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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
After evaluating the relevant statutory law, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that applicable case law also supported the finding that Blue Cross should
follow GAAP and reimburse the Hospital when the Hospital incurs a liability
to pay a doctor for services rendered. The court cited Villa View Hospital,
Inc. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1086, 1093 n.18 (9th Cir. 1983), in which the
Ninth Circuit held that GAAP provided the guidance for determining when,
under the Medicare Regulation, a provider incurs a reimbursable debt under
a deferred compensation plan. The Fourth Circuit noted but did not embrace
a contrary case that the Fifth Circuit decided. The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
concluded that the Act, the Medicare Regulation, and the relevant case law
all supported application of GAAP to determine proper reimbursement for
costs incurred under a deferred compensation plan.
After outlining the body of law supporting the GAAP method, the
court observed that the Secretary's regulatory interpretations deviated from
the GAAP approach. According to the Secretary's interpretations, to obtain
reimbursement during the period in which the Hospital incurred a debt the
Hospital would have to place the salary deferrals either in an "acceptable
type fund" or in the hands of a trustee. However, as the Hospital's savings
accounts and certificates of deposit did not constitute an "acceptable type
fund," Blue Cross could not reimburse the Hospital under the Medicare
Regulation until the Hospital paid the salary reductions to the physicians.
Because this outcome conflicted with the outcome that would have resulted
if the Secretary had used the GAAP approach and because the court found
that the statutory and case law favored GAAP, the court set aside the
Secretary's regulatory interpretations. In support of its conclusion, the court
explained that a doctor's choice to defer salary payments relates to the
manner of payment and does not detract from the real liability that the
hospital incurs. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district court.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
In Kendrick v. United States, 877 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 1104 (1990), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the doctrine established in Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), bars medical malpractice and loss of
consortium actions that an individual on the Army's Temporary Disability
Retired List (TDRL) and his son have brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. sections 2671-2680 (1982). According to the
court, Gary Kendrick (Kendrick) was injured in a motor vehicle accident
on March 12, 1985, while serving as an Army sergeant on active duty. The
court stated that military physicians treated Kendrick by prescribing Dilantin
for a possible seizure disorder that they thought may have contributed to
the accident. Kendrick continued Dilantin treatment until November 1985.
According to the court, the Army placed Kendrick on the TDRL on July
31, 1985, because of Kendrick's continuing health problems.
The plaintiffs alleged that Kendrick began to experience symptoms of
Dilantin toxicity in September 1985. The court noted that military physicians
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medically evaluated Kendrick in early November 1985. As a result of that
examination, Kendrick continued to receive the initially prescribed Dilantin
treatment until November 6, 1985. According to the court, in June 1987
the Army gave Kendrick permanent retirement status with a fifty percent
disability rating after later evaluations showed cerebellar dysfunction, prob-
ably related to Dilantin toxicity. The plaintiffs, Gary Kendrick and his son
Shane Kendrick, sued the United States government, alleging that military
physicians continued to prescribe Dilantin for Kendrick's seizure disorder
without adequately monitoring the level of the drug in his blood. The
plaintiffs contended that a toxic level of Dilantin proximately caused Ken-
drick's permanent brain damage.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina held
that the plaintiffs' claims were incident to military service and, thus, the
Feres doctrine barred the claims. Accordingly, the district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed, ar-
guing that Feres does not bar a servicemember's claim when the service-
member was not on active duty or subject to military control at the time
of the injury. The plaintiffs contended that a servicemember on TDRL is
not on active duty and is sufficiently free from military control to avoid
the Feres bar. The plaintiffs alleged that the Dilantin toxicity occurred while
Kendrick was on the TDRL, and consequently, the Feres doctrine should
not bar the plaintiffs' claims.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit examined the policies underlying
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Feres. The Feres doctrine
holds that "the government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to servicemen which arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." According to the Fourth Circuit, in deciding Feres,
the Supreme Court emphasized three basic rationales: the federal nature of
the relationship between members of the armed forces and the government;
the existing alternative compensation schemes for military personnel; and
the reluctance to damage military structure and discipline through court
intervention. In applying these rationales to the case at bar, the Fourth
Circuit court stated that, first, a uniform federal remedy was more appro-
priate for members injured in the armed forces than application of varying
local tort law under the FTCA. Second, the court reasoned that to allow
Kendrick's claim would provide him with double recovery because he already
was receiving compensation under the military's disability compensation
scheme. The court stated that allowing the claim would undermine the
integrity of the military's no-fault compensation plan. Third, the court
found that allowing tort claims against the military for service-related
injuries could disrupt military discipline, order, and commitment. The
Fourth Circuit thus reasoned that the district court's ruling that Feres barred
Kendrick's claims was consistent with the Supreme Court's Feres rationales.
The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that Feres is concerned with when
and under what circumstances the negligent act occurred, not when the
injury occurred. The court noted that, in establishing the TDRL, Congress
intended that personnel on the list still be considered members of the Armed
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Forces because personnel on the TDRL remain subject to military law and
discipline and are subject to return to active duty. In addition, the court
noted that TDRL personnel were admitted to military hospitals only because
of their military status. The court, therefore, concluded that an injury
sustained as a result of negligent treatment while the servicemember is on
the TDRL meets the "incident to service" test of Feres. As a result, Feres
bars any claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act that is based on an
injury sustained while on the TDRL.
The court in Kendrick further concluded that Feres clearly barred any
claim that Kendrick had prior to his placement on the TDRL. According
to the court, the negligent act of failure to monitor the Dilantin level began
while Kendrick was on active duty. Accordingly, the court held that the
Feres doctrine barred Kendrick's medical malpractice claim. The court held
that Feres barred Kendrick's son's loss of consortium claim as well because
that cause of action was derivative to Kendrick's claim that Feres barred.
The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the decision of the district court.
In Jarrett v. United States, 874 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth
Circuit considered whether a cause of action exists under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. sections 2671-2680 (1982), for the alleged
wrongful termination of Social Security benefits. In Jarrett the appellant's
deceased husband (Jarrett) had taken disability retirement in October 1980
due to a heart attack suffered in May of that year. Based on Jarrett's
serious heart disease, the West Virginia Disability Determination Section
(DDS), acting under an agreement with the Social Security Administration
(SSA), granted Jarrett disability insurance benefits. The benefits began in
October 1980. In June 1983, after a mandatory periodic review for contin-
uing disability payments, DDS determined that Jarrett's disability no longer
existed. The SSA affirmed the decision of DDS after randomly selecting
Jarrett's case for a quality assurance review. Jarrett requested reconsidera-
tion of the decision. Jarrett also requested that his benefits continue until
DDS concluded its reconsideration. DDS granted Jarrett's request for con-
tinuing payments. Upon reconsideration, DDS determined that the disability
still existed. Thus, Jarrett retained his disability benefits. Jarrett, however,
died of a heart attack two weeks after the DDS decision.
Mrs. Jarrett filed suit under the FTCA alleging a wrongful termination
of Social Security benefits. Mrs. Jarrett claimed that the termination of
benefits deprived Jarrett of life and property without due process of law.
The appellant also argued that DDS did not give Jarrett a sequential
evaluation of his claim as the Social Security Regulations require. The
appellant further contended that the termination of benefits caused a deep
depression in Jarrett that amounted to an intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The intentional infliction of emotional distress, the appellant ar-
gued, proximately caused Jarrett's death.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia denied Mrs. Jarrett's claims. The court held that the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. section 405(h) (1982), provides the exclusive remedy for any
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claims arising under the Social Security Act. Because the court found that
the plaintiff's claim arose under the Social Security Act, the court held that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the alleged causal link between the
alleged wrongful termination of benefits and the death of Jarrett gave rise
to a claim under the FTCA. The plaintiff argued that Congress granted the
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving deaths that the
wrongful acts of any employee of the federal government allegedly had
caused while the employee was acting within the scope of the employee's
duties. The United States contended that the dispute arose under the Social
Security Act. Thus, the United States argued that section 405(h) of the
Social Security Act provides the exclusive remedy.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit considered the effect of both
28 U.S.C. section 1346(b) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. section 405(h) (1982) on
the jurisdiction of the district court to hear Mrs. Jarrett's claims. The court
held that 28 U.S.C. section 1346(b) (1982) confers jurisdiction, but does
not create a cause of action. The court noted that the United States, being
sovereign, is immune from suit unless Congress specifically provides for a
waiver of sovereign immunity through a cause of action. Absent a congres-
sional provision for a cause of action, the court noted, district courts lack
jurisdiction to hear a dispute against the United States. The court then
found that, while the FTCA creates a waiver of sovereign immunity, section
405(h) limits the waiver. The court found that in section 405(h) Congress
specifically denied relief through the FTCA for claims arising under title II
of the Social Security Act. The court further found that Congress, under
section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, provided judicial review of
decisions that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had made.
According to the court, Congress intended that judicial review of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services' decisions constitute the sole
judicial relief available to a claimant under the Social Security Act.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain a tort claim arising under the Social Security Act.
The court reasoned that to grant jurisdiction to the district courts over tort
claims arising under the Social Security Act would contravene the clear
intent and expressions of Congress. Thus, the appellant, because her action
arose under the Social Security Act, must follow the sole remedy that the
Act provides.
Next, the court denied the appellant's claim against the administrators
of the benefits program. The court noted that in a similar case the United
States Supreme Court had found that, absent congressional action, courts
may not award money damages against federal officials for constitutional
torts. The Supreme Court also found that the disability review program
does not provide for monetary damages against officials who have denied
benefits, allegedly in violation of the fifth amendment. The Fourth Circuit,
relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning, held that, if Congress did not
include the right to seek monetary damages from officials for their uncon-
stitutional actions when Congress created the continuing disability review
